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ABSTRACT: Contrary to much Kant interpretation, this article argues that Kant’s
moral philosophy, including his account of charity, is irrelevant to justifying the
state’s right to redistribute material resources to secure the rights of dependents (the
poor, children, and the impaired). The article also rejects the popular view that Kant
either does not or cannot justify anything remotely similar to the liberal welfare
state. A closer look at Kant’s account of dependency relations in “The Doctrine of
Right” reveals an argumentative structure sufficient for a public institutional protec-
tion of dependents and evidence that Kant identifies concerns of economic justice as
lying at the heart of the state’s legitimacy.
RÉSUMÉ : Au contraire de ce qu’affirment bon nombre d’interprétations, le présent
article soutient que la philosophie morale de Kant et ses explications sur la charité
ne justifient pas adéquatement le droit de l’État à redistribuer les biens matériels afin
de garantir les droits des citoyens non autonomes (les pauvres, les enfants, les handi-
capés). Cet article rejette aussi l’idée largement diffusée que Kant ne justifie pas ou
est incapable de justifier quoi que ce soit s’approchant même vaguement d’un État
providence de type libéral. Une lecture attentive aux explications sur les relations de
dépendance que l’on trouve dans «La doctrine du droit» dévoile une structure argu-
mentative à même de défendre une institution publique vouée à la protection des ci-
toyens non autonomes et fournit des preuves à l’effet que Kant voit la question de la
justice économique comme un élément central de la légitimité de l’État.
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Introduction1
This article challenges much of  contemporary Kant-interpretation by
arguing that Kant can and indeed does justify the state’s right to redistrib-
ute resources to protect the rights of  dependents. Contrary to most Kant-
interpretation, I also argue that Kant’s moral philosophy, including his
account of  charity, is irrelevant to this justification. I will argue that if  we
take a closer look at Kant’s account of  dependency relations as found in
“The Doctrine of  Right” we have all that is needed to justify the state’s
right to coercively redistribute resources as required to make these rela-
tions rightful. 
According to Kant’s political philosophy as presented in the “Doctrine
of  Right,”2 a dependency relation is a relation between private persons,
where the freedom of  one person is subjected to the choices of  others. If  a
person’s freedom is subjected to another person’s arbitrary choice, then
the involved relation is wrongful. Kant’s claim is that it is impossible to
avoid this type of  wrongdoing in the state of  nature even if all persons act
on the best of  moral intentions. To use Arthur Ripstein’s phrase, justice is
not a “remedial virtue” for Kant, meaning that the state is seen as neces-
sary even if  we assume that no person ever wants to act viciously and that
the material resources available in the world are plentiful (Ripstein 2004,
p. 3).3 Consequently, we will see that not only is the state a necessary pre-
condition for justice even under ideal conditions, but also that the state’s
right to redistribute resources follows from the way in which the state
enables rightful private relations. On my interpretation, Kant establishes
an argumentative framework, according to which concerns of  economic
justice are identified as lying at the heart of  a state’s legitimacy.
Many Kant scholars will be surprised by my claim that Kant’s political
philosophy justifies anything remotely similar to the contemporary wel-
fare state. In fact, very few Kant interpreters and neo-Kantian philoso-
phers think that Kant in the “Doctrine of  Right” is at all concerned with
issues of  economic justice. In one way or another, most Kantians agree
with Wolfgang Kersting in his claim that
Kant’s legal and political equality lacks all economic implications and social
commitments; it cannot be used to justify the welfare state and to legitimize
welfare state programmes of  redistribution. The promotion of  social equality
and the increase of  economic justice is not considered as a legally necessary
political aim by Kant’s political philosophy. (Kersting 1992a, p. 153)4
Kersting also thinks it is impossible to justify anything remotely similar to
the liberal welfare state on the basis of  Kant’s position (ibid., p. 164, n.7).5
Of course, many contemporary neo-Kantians disagree with Kersting’s
claim, though they agree that in order to develop more egalitarian Kant-
Kant and Dependency Relations 259
ian theories of  justice it is necessary to depart from Kant’s actual theory.
How Kant’s position needs to be modified in order to incorporate con-
cerns of  economic justice depends on what aspects of  his theory one takes
to preclude attention to these concerns. Some, such as Onora O’Neill,
Allan D. Rosen, and John Rawls, identify the main problem as rooted in
Kant’s account of  charity. What makes Kant’s theory insensitive to con-
cerns of  economic justice, they argue, is that Kant’s principles of  justice
seem unresponsive to considerations of  need. These positions also agree
that a solution cannot be found within Kant’s “Doctrine of  Right.”6 Oth-
ers, such as Sarah W. Holtman and Paul Guyer, believe that by, reformu-
lating Kant’s position as found in the “Doctrine of  Right,” we can find
room for considerations of  economic justice. Finally, Hannah Arendt and
Alexander Kaufman agree with John Rawls that we must find a way of
making Kant’s principles of  justice apply to the human condition of  mate-
rial need, but they argue that the solution is to be found in Kant’s Critique
of Judgement, rather than in the “Doctrine of  Right.”7
I am in agreement with those Kantians, such as Rawls and Arendt, who
argue that a primary aim for Kant’s theory is that of  applying principles
of  justice to the empirical world. I also agree with those, such as O’Neill,
who emphasize that problems relating to dependency require public insti-
tutional solutions. Where I disagree with all of  these positions, though, is
that, in their move away from Kant’s actual position, they incorporate ele-
ments inconsistent with the fundamental principle of  a Kantian theory,
namely, individuals’ rights to freedom. Moreover, I disagree that Kant
does not provide the necessary elements to justify the state’s right to redis-
tribute material resources. Indeed, I argue that the “Doctrine of  Right”
includes everything required to justify what can loosely be referred to as
a liberal welfare state. 
I emphasize here how Kant’s defence of  the state’s right to redistribute
resources to protect the rights of  dependents follows from the foundation
of any liberal theory of  justice, namely, the individual’s right to freedom.
First, I give a brief  introduction to Kant’s conception of  political freedom.
Once Kant’s conception of  political freedom is clear, we see why the con-
temporary Kantian theories mentioned above must be rejected. Next, I
explain how the problems of  rightful acquisition entail that civil society is
an enforceable precondition for justice, meaning that public institutions
are required for just private relations. Understanding Kant’s arguments
concerning rightful acquisition of  private property and domestic relations
is crucial to understanding how a just state reconciles its rightful monop-
oly on coercion with dependents’ rights to freedom. We will see that the
state has the right to redistribute resources so as to protect the rights of
dependents even though no individual person has the corresponding right.
Furthermore, we will see why the state must posit laws establishing condi-
tions under which all persons with the necessary capacities can work them-
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selves into full private independence. Finally, I argue that since the state
has the duty to gradually transform itself  into what Kant calls a “true
republic,” it has the right to redistribute those resources necessary to
establish the institutions enabling all citizens to become active participants
in public reason. From the analysis of  these two aspects of  Kant’s position,
namely, the state’s reconciliation of  its rightful monopoly on coercion
through enabling rightful private relations and by transforming itself  into
a true republic, there arises a Kantian conception of  the just state that
comes close to what we today loosely refer to as a liberal welfare state.
Kant’s Conception of Political Freedom
Kant’s legal and political philosophy begins with the assumption that
human interactions must be reconcilable with each person’s only innate
right, namely, her right to freedom, or what Kant also calls “the right of
humanity in our own person” (6:240). The right to freedom is the individ-
ual’s right to “independence from being constrained by another’s choice
[Willkür] . . . insofar as it [the individual’s use of  freedom] can coexist with
the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law” (6:237).
The innate right to freedom is captured in Kant’s Universal Principle of
Right. It states: “[a]ny action is right if  it can coexist with everyone’s free-
dom in accordance with a universal law, or if  on its maxim the freedom of
choice of  each can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a
universal law” (6:230f, cf. 8:289f.). The conception of  political freedom
implied in the innate right to freedom and the Universal Principle of  Right
is a relational conception of  external freedom. According to this relational
conception, interacting persons’ actions are restricted only by universal
laws, meaning that their actions are restricted symmetrically and non-
contingently. With this conception of  political freedom in hand, we will see
that it is problematic to argue, as the various positions do, that Kant’s the-
ory is consistent with making charity enforceable (O’Neill, Rosen),with
making it responsive to need (Guyer, Rawls), or with turning into a capa-
bility approach (Kaufman).
In order to understand how the innate right to freedom and the Univer-
sal Principle of  Right lead to a relational conception of  political freedom
and to see why these contemporary Kantian theories give up something
distinctive and important to Kant’s theory, it is helpful to traverse the con-
ceptual territory. The innate right to freedom is the individual’s right to
independence from being constrained by the arbitrary choices of  others.
Issues of  justice or political freedom arise only in relation to uses of  free-
dom that possibly constrain or affect others, namely, what Kant calls
external freedom, which is the freedom we exercise when we set and pur-
sue ends of  our own. Political freedom, then, or the freedom protected by
the innate right to freedom, is not to be seen as unrestricted external free-
dom. Rather political freedom protects us from coercion, or from other
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persons’ subjecting our external freedom to their arbitrary choices. Polit-
ical freedom is a relation between interacting persons in the exercise of
their external freedom (6:231).
To say that Kant’s conception of  political freedom is explicitly rela-
tional in nature is to say that right or political freedom is concerned “only
with the external and indeed practical relation of  one person to another,
insofar as their actions, as deeds, can have (direct or indirect) influence on
each other” (6:230). If  my external actions do not affect another, for
example, if  I live alone on a desolate island or if  I sit at my desk and think
really hard, no issues of  justice or political freedom arise (6:261; cf.
27:523). In these cases I do, of  course, choose my own ends or exercise
freedom. Indeed, when I think really hard and when I am alone on the
desert island my actions are unrestricted by any other person. However,
since in these two cases there is no external interaction between others and
myself, there is no political freedom. Political freedom therefore is a lawful
(not unbounded) relation between individuals’ external freedom. Persons
who are free in the political sense are independent of  one another in that
their ability to set and pursue their own ends is not subject to each other’s
arbitrary choices. To have one’s freedom subject to another’s arbitrary
choice means that another person decides which ends one can pursue with
one’s own means. It means that one’s ability to set and pursue ends is no
longer under one’s own control. Conversely, the person who subjects
another’s external freedom to his arbitrary choice treats the subjected per-
son’s external freedom as a part of  his own means. A person considers
another person as a mere means if  he forces him to pursue certain ends, if
he coercively deprives him of  his rightful possessions, or if  he uses
another’s rightful possessions to pursue his own ends without having first
obtained consent from the owner. 
There is no conceptual space between right (political freedom) and
authorization to use coercion (hindrance of  freedom). Kant says that
“[r]ight and authorization to use coercion . . . mean one and the same
thing” (6:232). Political freedom is independence from coercion or free-
dom from other persons’ hindrances of  one’s external freedom. In other
words, each person has a right to hinder anyone who tries to stop her from
exercising her external freedom rightfully. This entails that rightful coer-
cion is the “hindering of a hindrance to freedom” (6:231; 8:292f.). There-
fore, a person has a right to hinder someone who attempts to hinder her
freedom, which is to say that right and authorization to use coercion
amount to the same thing. 
The innate right to freedom protects our right to independence with
regard to how we set our ends as long as these choices respect other per-
sons’ right to do the same. A politically free person is not required to use
his means to set any particular ends for himself  or required to act from
any particular motivation. It may at this point be useful to contrast Kant’s
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conception of  political freedom with his conception of  ethical freedom.
First, ethical freedom considers the motive or incentive behind an action
crucial to determining the morality of  the action. That is, in Kant’s ethical
theory a moral action is distinguished from an immoral action in part by
the motive behind the act. The moral person acts from the motive of  duty
and not, for example, out of  prudence.8 In political freedom, by contrast,
motive plays no role in determining the rightfulness of  actions, since the
incentive does not affect the question of  whether one person’s actions con-
strain another person’s freedom.9
Second, the ethically free person has a duty to act on certain subjective
maxims, such as those involving the perfection of  her natural and intellec-
tual capacities and responding to others’ needs by assisting them in their
pursuit of  happiness (6:386). However, as we saw above, the innate right
to freedom does not require a person to set any particular ends for himself.
Kant argues that right “does not signify the relation of  one’s choice to the
mere wish (hence also to the mere need) of  the other, as in actions of  benef-
icence and callousness, but only a relation to the other’s choice” (6:230).
In contrast to moral relations, rightful relations are not about how we
respond to other persons’ needs, but only how we respond to their choices
or to their right to use their means to pursue their own ends.10 Rightful
(political) relations are concerned with choices only, and therefore we
must distinguish between what we can choose and what we desire, want,
or wish. If  I do not have the means required to obtain what I desire, then
I am merely wishing I could do something. In contrast, if  I have the ability
(the required means) to fulfill a desire, I can take purposive action in
accordance with it or I can choose (Willkür) to fulfill my desire (6:213). In
this way, the means (things) I have as my own mark the limits of  my ability
to choose rightfully and thus set the limits for the ways in which I can use
external freedom rightfully. Anything beyond what I have means to obtain
can only be pursued rightfully if  others, say, out of  beneficence or gener-
osity, want to assist me; in this case they are morally responding to my
need. That someone has a moral obligation to respond to my need does
not mean that she has a political obligation to respond to it.11 
It is crucial to realize that rightful relations are distinct from moral rela-
tions in that they require us only to respect each others’ choices, meaning
that we must respect one another’s right to choose which (non-aggressive)
ends to pursue with one’s means. It might be helpful to consider this point
from a different angle. The innate right to freedom protects each individ-
ual’s right to set and pursue her own ends (rather than those of  another).
Particular ends are contingent in that they flow from an individual’s sub-
jective choices. Therefore, coercion can never involve enforcing some par-
ticular, contingent end without also denying some person’s innate right to
freedom (6:230; cf. 27:511f., 527, 539f.). Political freedom is to interact in
such a way that our freedom is never coercively subjected to one another’s
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arbitrary choices, but only to reciprocal non-contingent restrictions
(6:232). Any enforcement of  a particular end will involve giving some par-
ticular person a right to determine which ends another should pursue with
his means and this necessarily amounts to depriving him of his right to
freedom. 
In light of  the above, we can now delineate which restrictions upon
actions are consistent with political freedom, namely, which are restricted
by universal law and which are not. We have established that rightful
restrictions upon a person’s external freedom cannot involve forcing him
to use his means to pursue contingent ends. Such use of coercion subjects
his external freedom to someone else’s arbitrary choice. Moreover, to be
consistent with political freedom it follows that restrictions must be sym-
metrical or reciprocal. Symmetrical or reciprocal restrictions are those that
restrict similar actions in the same way. Asymmetrical or non-reciprocal
restrictions are irreconcilable with all persons having equal rights to free-
dom because they involve permitting one of  the interacting persons to
exercise his external freedom in a way that asymmetrically constrains oth-
ers in their exercise of  freedom. Laws that restrict rightfully are universal:
therefore they cannot involve forcing a particular person to use his means
to pursue particular, contingent ends and they must restrict persons sym-
metrically or reciprocally. 
It follows from the above that the theories proposed by Guyer, Kauf-
man, O’Neill, Rawls, and Rosen fundamentally conflict with that of  Kant
in that they all defend what he considers to be contingent restrictions
upon persons’ actions. Presupposing particular needs (Guyer, Kaufman,
Rawls) when applying the principles of  justice or suggesting that state
institutions can make the charity right enforceable (O’Neill, Rosen)
results in contingent restrictions on our actions. Such contingent restric-
tions entail that some particular persons’ freedom is subjected to the arbi-
trary choices of  others rather than restricted only by principles of
freedom. For this reason I believe that these contemporary interpretations
are inconsistent with Kant’s own position, and therefore they are funda-
mentally flawed.
The Impossibility of Justice in the State of Nature
We have seen that on Kant’s position justice or political freedom is a
condition under which the external choices of  all interacting persons
are restricted by universal laws reconcilable with each person’s right to
freedom. Such a condition obtains only if  the interacting persons’ exter-
nal freedom is restricted symmetrically or reciprocally as well as non-
contingently. Therefore, rightful use of  coercion is coercion that restricts
symmetrically and non-contingently. Wrongful use of  coercion is arbi-
trary use of  coercion whereby one person subjects another person’s exter-
nal freedom to his arbitrary choice rather than to universal law. Kant
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argues that coercion is rightful only within civil society and that justice is
impossible in the state of  nature even if  all persons act on the best of  inten-
tions. But why is this so? That is, why is it impossible to subject one’s uses
of  external freedom to universal law or to avoid wrongful uses of  external
freedom (wrongful coercion) in the state of  nature? There are two reasons:
first, it is impossible to provide rightful assurance of  rightful possessions
in the state of  nature (6:245-57), and, second, it is impossible to acquire
external things rightfully in this condition (6:258-307). Without rightful
assurance and rightful acquisition, political freedom is impossible. For
our purposes here it is unnecessary to consider the argument concerning
rightful assurance, so I focus only on the issue of  rightful acquisition.
Acquisition of Rightful Possessions: The Problem of 
Indeterminacy and Enforcement
The innate right to freedom requires that my external freedom is subjected
only to my arbitrary choice and otherwise only restricted by universal law.
In order to have external freedom it must also be possible for me to possess
means with which I can set and pursue my own ends. Kant calls such
means “objects of  my choice.” Objects of  my choice are any means I not
only “have the physical power to use” (6:246), but that also constitute part
of  my ability to set and pursue ends. Since rightful possession beyond my
body is not innate, we must explain how affirmative acts can give rise to
an acquired right in an external object of  choice (6:237). Kant argues that
there are three different kinds of  rightful possession, namely, those
involved in private property, contract relations, and rightful domestic
relations.12 For our purposes here, we need only focus on the problems
that arise in the spheres of  private property and domestic relations in the
state of  nature.
Since Kant has a relational conception of  right, we must understand
original acquisition as primarily a relation between persons—and not as
a relation between the acquiring person and the thing acquired (6:258f.).
Because Kant’s conception is relational in this way, it aims to capture how
rightful acquisition entails obligations on behalf  of  everyone to respect the
rightful acquisition of  an object by some particular individual (6:260). At
the same time, of  course, unilateral acquisition is not relational and can-
not give rise to rightful obligations. The task for Kant then is to reconcile
unilateral acquisition with the relational requirement of  right. But this
reconciliation is problematic because our individual choices, and hence
the actual boundaries we draw between what we consider to be our own
and what belongs to others, are entirely contingent from the point of  view
of freedom. An individual cannot justify his claim that his particular
boundary of  ownership is objectively better than any other proposed
boundary. Therefore, there arises a problem of  indeterminacy with respect
to determining the boundaries of  rightful acquisition (6:266f.). This prob-
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lem of  indeterminacy arises not because we cannot know what the bound-
ary of  a possession is, but because there is no single non-contingent
(objective) standard by appeal to which an individual can justify his
boundary over anyone else’s. Therefore, any unilaterally drawn boundary
cannot give rise to other persons’ obligations not to interfere with a par-
ticular acquisition because such a unilaterally drawn boundary is neces-
sarily arbitrary and does not restrict in ways reconcilable with the
Universal Principle of  Right. So, in the state of  nature, we cannot appeal
to the Universal Principle of  Right to solve the problem of  indeterminacy
because it is the application of  the principle itself  that is indeterminate—
there is no single correct way to apply the principle. That is, it is impossible
for individuals in the state of  nature to apply the Universal Principle of
Right and thereby rightfully determine the quantity and quality of  any
single appropriation of  goods, because such an application of  the princi-
ple will be unilateral and arbitrary and therefore irreconcilable with itself
(8:289f.). For these reasons, private property in the full sense of  the word
is impossible in the state of  nature.13
The only way to apply the Universal Principle of  Right in a way that is
reconcilable with itself  must go through the postulate of  a general will or
a public authority. As I have argued, the problem of  indeterminacy with
respect to determining rightful rules for original acquisition requires a
solution that cannot be conceptually reduced to the particular private will
of  each person. Only by establishing a public authority, or “the lawgiving
of the will of  all thought as united a priori” (6:268), to specify and enforce
standards for appropriation of  property, can the problem of  indetermi-
nacy be overcome and rightful relations among acquiring persons be
achieved. With respect to any pair of  interacting individuals, the general
will is the will of  each one of  them united as one will. A public will is not
tied to any particular private interest, so its restrictions are not contin-
gent, and therefore they are reconcilable with each person’s right to free-
dom. This is because the public authority has the appropriate standing
with respect to all the interacting individuals. It can rightfully posit and
enforce laws since it is the will of  all as opposed to the will of  any partic-
ular one. In this way, civil society is necessary to make private property
rights determinate and enforceable.
Why Civil Society Is an Enforceable Precondition for Domestic Right 
Similarly, it is also impossible in the state of  nature to make domestic rela-
tions—what Kant calls status relations—rightful. A status relation is a
relation between persons in which one person has the right to “make
arrangements” affecting another person’s private life (6:259). Since these
relationships involve legally enforceable claims to the private life of
another person, Kant describes these rights as concerning “what is mine
or yours domestically” and also as the “most personal” of  all rights
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(6:277). It is a right a person has to possess another person “as a thing.”
This means that the possessor has a right to share a domestic sphere with
the possessed person and to set private ends for her. Obviously, since it is
a person who is possessed, the use of  the one possessed can only be “as a
person” (6:277) and not as a thing, meaning that one can only set moral
ends for the other person.14
As pointed out by Barbara Herman (2002) and Arthur Ripstein (2004),
the first problem that arises in status relations is that consent cannot do
the legitimating work it does in contracts. This is not because status rela-
tions include relations between caregivers and care-receivers who cannot
assume responsibility for themselves. The reason is that status relations
involve rights to persons rather than rights against persons. This means
that the possessor presumably has a right to set an indeterminate number
of  (moral) ends within the private or domestic sphere of  another person.
The problem is that a person cannot (consensually or not) enter into a
relation where her own person is no longer subject to her own choice. This
is slavery. And the open-ended, personal character of  status relations
appears to entail exactly this. As we will see, this problem is solved by giv-
ing persons involved in status relations reciprocal, open-ended rights to
one another’s person. 
The second problem arising in status relations that cannot be solved in
the state of  nature concerns the enforcement of  claims to persons. It is this
problem that leads Kant to argue that we can acquire status (or posses-
sion) with regard to another person only “by law” (lege) (6:276). The rea-
son it is impossible to conceive of  rightful, enforceable claims against one
another’s person in the state of  nature is that within the conceptual frame-
work of  this condition, there is no person outside of  a particular status
relation who is authorized to intervene in it. Hence, the judgement about
whether the parties are acting in one another’s best interests, or within
“moral boundaries,” becomes the judgement of  the stronger person in the
relationship. Without a public authority to act as a “civil guardian” over
the parties involved in status relations, it is impossible to ensure that the
relationship is rightful, rather than one of  abuse and wrongdoing. 
Both problems, of  establishing reciprocity and enforceable claims, arise
in each of  the three types of  status relations. Status relations arise when
parents obtain children, when husbands obtain wives, and when families
obtain servants (6:277; cf. 27:642). Kant meets the first challenge of  justi-
fying such acquisitions of  persons by arguing that the possessed person
must have rights reciprocal to those of  the possessor. Such reciprocal pos-
session is necessary to reconcile the possession of  a person with the innate
right of  humanity. Reciprocity is secured in these relationships by also giv-
ing children, wives, and servants legally enforceable claims against the
person of  their parents, husbands, and employer families. Nevertheless,
Kant argues this is insufficient to make the three types of  status relations
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rightful in the state of  nature. The reason for this is common to all three
status relations. A more careful consideration of  the parent-child relation
will elicit the problems in a way that allows for a more abbreviated discus-
sion of  the other two relations.
On Kant’s view, children are persons and therefore possess the innate
right of  humanity (6:280ff.). Yet at the same time children cannot set and
pursue their own ends in a morally responsible manner. They require as-
sistance from others to learn how to do this. Since parents unilaterally
decide to bring children into the world, they are responsible for taking care
of them until the children can take care of  themselves.15 Parents have a
duty to provide their children with care—understood as conditions under
which they can develop their pragmatic, theoretical, and practical capac-
ities sufficiently to become persons capable of  living independent lives
(6:281). To reconcile parents’ rights to set ends for their children with the
children’s right of  humanity, parents cannot make their children means
only to their own ends. To use children in such a way conflicts with the
child’s innate right to freedom, because it both involves using the child as
a mere means, and it inhibits the child’s ability to learn to set and pursue
her own ends independently. Indeed, parents must set ends for their chil-
dren, but only those ends that further the child’s ability to become a mor-
ally and legally responsible person.16 Therefore, parents cannot rightfully
set immoral ends for their children, such as self-destructive ends. Parents
who fail to provide their children with such conditions of  care wrong their
children.
The problem that remains in the state of  nature is that no one except
the parents of  the child is authorized to act on behalf  of  the child and,
consequently, children’s rights are unprotected in the state of  nature. No
one particular individual, including the child, has the appropriate stand-
ing in relation to the child that authorizes him to evaluate the parents’
ability to act on the child’s behalf  or to intervene or replace the parents in
cases of  severe mistreatment of  the children. Consequently, though a par-
ent wrongs the child, the child has no remedy, since neither the child nor
any other adult person (non-parent) has the standing that allows rightful
overruling of  the parents’ decision. Insofar as we are in the state of  nature,
rightful relations between parents and their children cannot be realized
because the evaluation of  whether a particular parent is acting in the
child’s best interests rests solely with that parent. The possible wrongdoer
becomes his own judge. This is why there is something inherently abusive
about this kind of  status relation in the state of  nature.17 The only way to
ensure that these relations are rightful is to establish a public authority
comprising the general will to protect the rights of  children. Only a public
authority can have the proper standing to evaluate the rightfulness of  par-
ticular parent-child relations and to engage in rightful enforcement.
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Kant argues that, as status relations, the relationship between husbands
and wives and between families and their servants are characterized by the
same formal problem as the relationship between parents and their chil-
dren.18 As in the case with children and their parents, one person entitled
to represent another gives rise to the problem of securing protection
against wrongdoing between these persons in the state of  nature. Wives
and servants, on the other hand, are morally and legally responsible per-
sons, and their consent is necessary to establish rightful status relations
with them. From this point onwards, however, the argument is quite sim-
ilar: because these relations are status relations, the legal claims involved
include the right of  one person to set private ends or restrict the private
sphere of  another. Hence, the first step involved in making these kinds of
relations rightful, Kant argues, must be to make the legal claims reciprocal.
Husbands and wives, as well as servants and their families, must have legal
claims to one another’s person. 
According to Kant, however, justice is not realized simply by giving
wives and servants reciprocal legal claims. In the state of  nature, there exist
only self-contained, private, domestic spheres, and no one outside of  such
a private sphere has the appropriate standing to evaluate the rightfulness
of  the relations within it. Therefore, there is no rightful use of  coercion
with regard to domestic relations. To establish domestic right there must
be established a person with the appropriate standing to adjudicate dis-
putes and enforce those judgements amongst adults sharing a domestic
sphere. Only a public authority can have this standing, since only a public
person can be the will of  all, and hence have the right to make enforceable
decisions concerning both parties. Finally, as in parent-child relations, it
is insufficient to designate a private third person to adjudicate and enforce
domestic right involving adults. No private individual can fulfill this func-
tion, since she does not enjoy the requisite standing to enforce rights.
Moreover, consent cannot do the work of  establishing appropriate stand-
ing, because consent cannot give rise to enforceable rights. A public
authority is therefore necessary to have enforceable domestic rights
amongst adult persons. Furthermore, to reconcile its interventions with
each person’s innate right to freedom, the way in which it interferes must
be symmetrical and in accordance with posited, non-arbitrary laws of
domestic right. 
We have seen that only a public authority can overcome the problems
of indeterminacy and enforcement in a way consistent with each person’s
right to freedom. Kant therefore concludes his discussion of  private right
in the first part of  the “Doctrine of  Right” by arguing that we must accept
a second postulate, namely, that of  public right (6:306-307). Public right is
not a remedy against any “inconveniences” of  the state of  nature, but is a
precondition of  justice whose necessity is not demonstrated by appeal to
our animal nature or to the lack of  worldly resources. Kantian circum-
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stances of  justice are not those of  Locke or Hume. Rather than viewing the
state as prudentially necessary to establish justice, Kant considers it a con-
dition for the possibility of  political freedom. He argues that civil society
is strictly necessary to establish justices regardless of  how well disposed
people are towards one another or how plentiful the resources (6:312).
Until what belongs to each is determined by a public authority, rightful
relations have not been established. Therefore, Kant’s non-consensual
conception of  political obligations, or the duty to enter civil society, fol-
lows from the right of  humanity and the duty not to wrong anyone. It has
nothing to do with prudence or our tendency to act viciously.19
At this point it is clear that we have a strict duty to enter civil society in
order to ensure rightful relations amongst private individuals. I now turn
to the question of  what a political power must look like if  it is to count as
a civil authority. Kant argues that in order for the political power to estab-
lish those rightful relations between individuals that were impossible in
the state of  nature, it must represent the general will by constituting itself
as the will of  each person born within its jurisdiction (4:294f.; 6:317, 330).
This means that the public authority must posit and enforce laws in such
a way that they secure each citizen’s freedom, equality, and independence
(6:314; 8:290). Moreover, Kant argues, this cannot mean only that the
public authority must set itself  up with a monopoly on uses of  coercion;
it must also reconcile its monopoly with each individual’s right to free-
dom. This is something possible only if  the public authority establishes a
certain institutional structure, without which a particular political power
is not a legitimate civil authority. And without legitimacy no political
obligations exist. In addition, Kant argues that, although the existence of
political obligations does not depend on it, the state must also transform
itself  into a “true republic” or one in which the people govern themselves
through active participation in public reason. Since my concern is depend-
ency relations, I will focus only on the state’s duty to establish institutional
protection for the poor and its right and duty to transform itself  into a
true republic. 
How Civil Society (Public Right) Enables Rightful Dependency Relations 
We find Kant’s explicit discussion of  the state’s institutional protection of
the poor in Section C of  public right (6:325-28). However, I will argue that
we should consider relevant three other aspects of  Kant’s theory when we
develop his full conception of  rightful dependency relations: first, Kant’s
comments that citizens must find themselves within a framework of  pos-
itive law within which they can work themselves into active citizenship;
second, his view that the state is necessary to make domestic relations
rightful, and, finally, his argument that the state must evolve into a true
republic. When all these considerations are brought into play, we see that
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Kant’s conception of  the just state may just as easily be described as a lib-
eral welfare state.20 
Let us start by unpacking Section C of  public right. In order to under-
stand this section correctly, it is important to remember that for Kant the
state is an enforceable and necessary precondition for property broadly
understood, and it is an enforceable precondition for private property
relations, contractual relations, and domestic relations. Because a public
authority necessarily has a monopoly on coercion, a specific problem
arises in that the state creates a dependency relation between itself  and its
subjects that it must make rightful. By this I mean that individuals no
longer have the right to use coercion to set and pursue ends of  their own
since all uses of  coercion are now under the auspices of  the state. The
question then is how to make the dependency relation rightful between
the state and those who have no means and no right to use coercion to
pursue their ends. What the state must do is ensure that its monopoly on
coercion is not such that any one of  its subjects is deprived of  his innate
right to freedom. That is, the state must ensure that no individual’s exter-
nal freedom is subject to another’s arbitrary choices. Kant’s claim is that
this can be done only by means of  an institutional guarantee of  uncondi-
tional poverty relief.
To reconcile its rightful monopoly on coercion with the rights of  the
poor, the state must ensure that no person finds herself  without any means
whatsoever with which to pursue ends. To be free in the external sense
requires the possession of  external things, and therefore unconditional
poverty relief  is necessary if  the state is to fulfill its role, namely, to provide
conditions under which persons can exercise their innate right to freedom.
Without such unconditional poverty relief  the poor have no freedom,
since they have nothing, and any access to means goes through some other
private person’s consent either to hire them or provide them with charity.
Essentially, then, because the poor have no means, their right to set and
pursue ends is subject to the arbitrary choices of  those who have means.
Consequently, if  the state upholds its monopoly on coercion, the state
must also step in to ensure that the poor do not find themselves in such a
condition. This is why Kant maintains that the state has a right and a duty
to tax the rich in order to provide unconditional relief  for the poor, even
though he also says that no individual private person has the right to
coerce another to give her resources to the poor.21 
With respect to children and care-receivers in general, the state must
establish those institutions necessary to ensure that all children and those
not able to care for themselves are provided with capable caregivers. On
the one hand, the state has the right to redistribute the necessary resources
to increase parents’ ability to care for their children, say, by providing
them with child-care education or by giving them financial support. On
the other hand, the state must also establish institutions that solve prob-
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lems of  abusive, deceased, or absent parents. This may involve supporting
and supervising what Kant calls private “foundling homes” (6:325f.) or
what we understand in contemporary terms as private caretaking institu-
tions for children. In these ways, the state ensures that all poor persons,
including children and those otherwise unable to care for themselves, are
provided with poverty relief.
Following from the argument justifying the redistribution of  resources
to provide relief  for the poor is the radical claim that a society having per-
sons with no means, and access to means only through charity or other
persons’ private decisions to employ them, is one in which there is no
political freedom. This is because the state is not providing conditions
under which all persons can exercise their innate right to freedom. With-
out a guarantee of  unconditional poverty relief, the state’s monopoly on
coercion is irreconcilable with the poor person’s right to freedom, which
means that the state has not fulfilled the requirement that it provides con-
ditions under which all persons can exercise their rights to freedom.
Remember that political freedom consists in rightful relations between all
persons, which means that the denial of  any person’s right to freedom
entails also the denial of  political freedom for all. Therefore, without an
institutional guarantee of  unconditional poverty relief, the state is not
legitimate and political obligations do not exist. It is important to clarify
that the claim is not that the state, in order to be legitimate, must have an
extensive welfare system. The claim is only that the state must take insti-
tutional steps whereby it makes means available to those who have none.22 
The above suffices—indeed, on its own—to explain why issues of  eco-
nomic justice are central to Kant’s conception of  the just state. Neverthe-
less, as mentioned above, I believe that there are three additional
considerations of  economic justice underwriting this claim. I will con-
sider, first, Kant’s argument that all citizens must be able to work them-
selves into what he calls “an active condition.” Kant explains in the
sections on public right that the just state is compatible with the existence
of  passive citizens, namely, persons who “have to be under the direction
or protection of  other individuals, and so do not possess civil independ-
ence” (6:315). By this he means that the mere existence of  persons who are
not fully independent of  other private individuals is not in itself  a sign of
injustice. His examples include children, women, and apprentices—all
persons who are in a passive condition in that they do not have the means
required to enjoy full private independence. Kant, however, emphasizes
that conditions under which passive citizens can work themselves into an
active condition must be secured:
For from their being able to demand that all others treat them in accordance with
laws of natural freedom and equality as passive parts of  the state, it does not fol-
low that they also have the right to manage the state itself  as active members of
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it, the right to organize it or to cooperate for introducing certain laws . . . [but
the] positive laws [must] not be contrary to the natural laws of  freedom and the
equality of  everyone in the people corresponding to this freedom, namely that
anyone can work his way up from this passive condition to an active one. (6:315,
8:295f.)23
Granted, in this passage, Kant is talking about active citizenship in a
democracy. Nevertheless, civil society need not be a democracy in order
for the same point to apply. That is, Kant is defending the view that,
despite the fact that the empirical requirements of  active citizenship can
change depending on whether civil society is, say, a democracy or an aris-
tocracy, no posited law can make it impossible for persons to work them-
selves from a passive condition into an active one. In other words, no
person can be denied through law the right to become an active citizen. 
There are two plausible ways to interpret this passage as suggesting that
Kant intends the possibility of  obtaining active citizenship to be a mini-
mal condition on the state’s legitimacy. We can understand Kant to be
saying that the minimal condition consists in the requirement that a legit-
imate state cannot posit laws according to which some particular person
is denied the right, either by the state or by some private person, to work
herself  out of  her passive condition. On this rather weak interpretation,
no one can be explicitly and legally denied the right to choose to pursue
active citizenship. For example, women, or any social or ethnic group,
cannot be denied the right to appropriate private property. More gener-
ally, the state cannot posit laws that allow discrimination on the basis of
race, gender, or ethnicity with regard to whatever means are required to
obtain active citizenship. On this weaker interpretation, to secure condi-
tions under which a person can move from a passive to an active condition
just means that the state has a negative duty in the sense that it must not
legislate in a way that explicitly denies a person the possibility of  obtain-
ing active citizenship. 
On the stronger interpretation, to secure conditions under which per-
sons can move from a passive to an active condition means that the state
has a positive duty to ensure that the totality of  legislation is such that all
persons actually can work themselves into an active condition. For exam-
ple, on this reading, the positive duty might consist in legislation that
ensures that no one person must accept work under conditions incompat-
ible with obtaining an active condition. The state reconciles its monopoly
on uses of  coercion only if  it ensures that no one finds herself  in a situation
where the only choices available to her promise nothing but a perpetual
passive condition. This means that the state ensures that the poor can
work themselves into independent persons economically, financially, and
with respect to land ownership. The state ensures that the poor are not
denied participation in these systems due to a lack of  means and that all
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persons can work themselves into full private independence within these
systems. I believe that this stronger interpretation of  Kant’s position is the
interpretation that is most fully reconcilable with his most fundamental
assumption, namely, each person’s right to freedom.
We have seen that the state’s legitimacy requires unconditional poverty
relief  and conditions under which passive citizens can work themselves
into an active condition. Still, as noted above, I think that Kant’s position
also supports the additional claim that, unless the state provides institu-
tional guarantees of  domestic relations, it is not legitimate. Although the
claim has no direct textual support, I think it follows from Kant’s position
that in order for domestic relations to be rightful there must be a public
authority with standing to the relationship to provide the means through
which a distinction can be drawn between wrongful and rightful relations.
If  the state establishes a monopoly on coercion that does not distinguish
between rightful and wrongful uses of  coercion in the domestic sphere,
then it fails to reconcile its coercion with each person’s innate right to free-
dom. Not to do so is to uphold a monopoly on coercion that is irrecon-
cilable with a person’s right not to be subject to other persons’ arbitrary
choices. Therefore, the state must establish a public institution with the
appropriate standing to determine rightful and wrongful uses of  coercion
in domestic relations. Since the reasoning is analogous with regard to the
domestic right of  married couples and families who have servants, it is not
necessary to investigate the details of  these arguments. Instead we simply
note that the state must set up institutions as necessary to secure the right-
fulness of  all domestic relations. For servants, this may require public
institutions responsible for ensuring that servants find themselves under
decent working conditions, whereas for married couples, it may require
the provision of  institutional solutions to persons experiencing marital
problems. It is impossible a priori to specify exactly how the state fulfills
its role as a civil guardian: the only thing we can say a priori is that it must
set up institutions by which it aims to enable rightful domestic relations.
We have seen that the legitimate state must provide unconditional pov-
erty relief  in the form of  public institutions to protect a person’s right to
have means or be externally free. I have also argued that there are two
additional related conditions on state legitimacy that follow from Kant’s
account: first, a legitimate state must provide conditions under which no
citizen is either denied the legal right or actually cannot work herself  from
a passive to an active condition; and, second, the state must establish insti-
tutions to secure domestic rights. These arguments lead to the conclusion
that concerns of  economic justice are essential to the state’s legitimacy:
without the state’s redistribution of  resources to protect the rights of
dependents with respect to poverty relief, institutional solutions to passive
citizenship, and domestic conflicts, the state is not legitimate and no polit-
ical obligations exist.24 In contrast to the claims of  Kersting and others, I
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conclude that Kant actually identifies issues of  dependency, including eco-
nomic justice, as determining the existence of  political obligations.25
Perhaps the most surprising implication of  these arguments is that, con-
trary to most Kantians, Kant does not consider the rights of  the state and
the rights of  individuals as identical. Indeed, if  we read Kant’s theory as
identifying the coercive rights of  individuals with those of  the state, we
mask the ways in which Kant’s account actually identifies issues of  eco-
nomic justice as lying at the heart of  a state’s legitimacy. The right to redis-
tribute resources is beyond the rights of  individuals, and yet institutional
redistribution of  resources is strictly required for state legitimacy. In addi-
tion, on the assumption that the state’s rights are equivalent to individu-
als’ rights, the redistribution of  resources is in violation of  individuals’
rights to freedom. In other words, since any private redistribution will
conflict with the individual’s innate right to freedom, contemporary Kant-
ians encounter problems when trying to explain why the state has the right
to coercively redistribute resources even though no individual enjoys the
same right. And yet, explaining the state’s right to coercively redistribute
resources is necessary to finding a convincing Kantian solution to the
problem of  the protection of  the rights of  vulnerable dependents in civil
society. I have suggested that, in fact, in the “Doctrine of  Right,” Kant
provides the solution by explaining why we must let go of  the assumption
that the state’s rights cannot outstrip the rights of  individuals.
In these final sections, let me turn to the state’s right and duty to provide
conditions in which citizens can become active participants in public rea-
son. In my view, the state must have the right and duty to enable partici-
pation in public reason because it has the right and duty to transform
itself  into a “true republic” in which citizens are “the sovereign itself”: cit-
izens in a “true republic” are self-legislators through active participation
in the public reason of  the sovereign (6:341). But because political obliga-
tions do not depend on the state transforming itself  into a true republic,
this transformation is not required in order for the state to be politically
legitimate or for political obligations to arise. Nevertheless, this does not
undermine the general argument that the ideal republican organizational
form requires that the people govern themselves through public reason,
and the state can become this kind of  a republic only if  it makes possible
that people can become capable participants in public reason. So,
although the state need not be a “true republic” in order for political obli-
gations to exist, it must strive towards providing conditions under which
persons can participate in public reason. 
We can distinguish between two parts of  public reason, namely, public
discussion and public offices or professional positions, both of  which are
constitutive of  a public coercive authority.26 In order to partake in both
these aspects of  public reason, citizens must have the requisite knowledge
and qualifications. First, one cannot engage in public discussion of  public
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matters without a certain level of  knowledge of  public affairs. Therefore,
the state has the right and duty to provide all persons with the education
necessary to participate in public discussion. Second, one cannot govern
oneself  through public reason if  one does not have the requisite ability to
hold public positions and professional offices. That is, at least in Western
societies today, public power is exercised through public administrative
and political offices and through professional titles, such as academic
professors, chartered accountants, lawyers, physicians, and engineers.
These offices are typically entrusted with the daily application of  the
state’s laws and policies, and they perform important advisory functions
to the government, legislators, and the Supreme Court. Hence, if  “the
people” are to govern themselves, they must be able to hold such public
positions and professional offices, and the state must (gradually) trans-
form itself  into a system that provides institutional protection—through
education—of the right to obtain this ability. Providing educational
opportunities for all citizens with the requisite capacities is a prerequisite
for a state organized according to the republican ideal, since education is
the means through which people can obtain the abilities required to par-
ticipate in self-legislation through public reason.27
Conclusion
The aim of  this article has been to defend an alternative to the standard
Kantian interpretation of  dependency relations, namely, one that does not
make any appeal to the imperfect duty of  charity or to Kant’s moral phi-
losophy, but stays strictly within his conception of  justice as we find it in
the “Doctrine of  Right.” We have seen that the strength of  Kant’s account
of  dependency relations is in part its ability to capture essential, enforce-
able aspects of  these relations, and in part to demonstrate that justice
requires a public institutional framework if  interactions between inde-
pendent persons and dependants are to be rightful. We have seen that the
just state must establish institutions that provide unconditional poverty
relief  and institutions necessary to ensure domestic right. In addition, the
state must posit laws that ensure that the poor can work themselves into
full independence from other private persons. Thus, in a truly civil society,
passive citizens, or citizens who lack full private independence, necessarily
include only children and the mentally incapacitated. All others can enjoy
full private independence from one another. In its roles of  guarantor of
external freedom and civil guardian, the state’s rights and duties to pro-
tect its citizens’ rights to freedom exceed the rights of  individuals. Fur-
thermore, we saw that, though the existence of  political obligations does
not depend upon this, the state has the right and duty to transform itself
into a true republic in which the people govern themselves through public
reason. Finally, we concluded that establishing this civil, legal framework
to regulate our interactions constitutes an aspect of  realizing ourselves as
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free beings: it is not a remedial response to our typical tendency to act
viciously. And a fortuitous advantage of  this interpretation is that it is
possible to explain justice in terms of  freedom without appealing to some
particular conception of  needs or some particular view of  morality or reli-
gion. Instead, its claims are grounded on the implications of  our having
an innate right to freedom understood as an innate right to set and pursue
ends independently of  the arbitrary choices of  others.
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tions (dealing with public right) are currently subject to so much discussion,
and still so important, that they can well justify postponing a decisive judge-
ment for some time” (6:209).
21 For example see 6:325f., cf. 27:539. The stronger interpretation of  Kant’s posi-
tion here, I have suggested, points out that the state must reconcile its monop-
oly on coercion with the rights of  each, and this is why it must provide
unconditional poverty relief  since only in this way can it reconcile property
owners’ exclusive property rights with the rights of  the poor.
22 In light of  the above, Kant’s comments about the rich and the poor in “Theory
and Practice” must be interpreted with care. Kant argues that the “complete
equality of  men as subjects in a nation is completely consistent with the great-
est inequality in the quantity and degree of  possessions they have, whether
these be physical or mental superiority over others, or fortuitously acquired
external goods. . . . Thus, the welfare of  one very much depends on the will of
another (that of  the poor on that of  the rich), one must obey (as the child its
elder or the wife her husband) while the other commands, and one must serve
(as laborer) while the other pays, etc. Nevertheless, as regards right (which, as
the expression of  the general will, can only be singular, for it concerns the form
of right and not the matter or object regarding which I have rights) they are,
as subjects, all equal to one another. For no one can coerce anyone else except
through public law” (8:291f.). Thus, we must note two things: First, inequality
as such cannot be determining for the rightfulness of  property relations in a
society because of  the problem of  indeterminacy. That is, it is impossible to
quantify what is permissible inequality in a society. Second, it is also the case
that the welfare of  particular individuals can depend upon the choices others
make in society, and, indeed, that those with fewer resources will find their
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welfare in many ways dependent upon the choices more resourceful persons
make. For example, if  the rich decide to spend their time investing in and
developing the economy, rather than, say, travelling around the world, this
will be determining for the welfare of  the less resourceful. However, in my
view, we should not infer from this that the poor can be absolutely subjected
to the choices of  the rich in the sense that there can be no institutions securing
unconditional poverty relief. Though disagreements on the content of  these
issues cannot give rise to a right to coercively resist the public authority, the
public authority must have some such institutions in place so as to make sure
that the poor person’s freedom (not their welfare as such) is subjected to the
arbitrary choices of  others.
23 We may note an interpretative puzzle that arises when Kant claims that “any-
one can work his way up from his passive condition to an active one” (empha-
sis added). It should also be noted, however, that in the German text, “his”
does not occur, but rather the gender-neutral sich—referring back to “the peo-
ple” (Völk). I am grateful to Svein Eng for making me aware of  this point. In
“Theory and Practice” Kant argues that it is obvious without argument that
being “an adult male” is a qualification for being an active citizen (8:295).
There are two possible explanations for this: (a) Kant believes women lack
something essential (“in their nature”) that makes it impossible for them to
ever become active citizens; or (b) Kant believes women lack the required
independence needed to advance, since they (as a group) never enjoy the inde-
pendence enjoyed by many men. The first explanation cannot be justified on
Kant’s account, whereas the second one can. On my view, the stronger inter-
pretation of  this second explanation considers women of  Kant’s time doubly
disadvantaged: first, women could not work their way to independence
because their freedom was subjected to the choices of  their husbands or the
patriarchs of  their original family. This problem could be addressed simply by
giving women equal rights, such as rights to education, inheritance, choice in
marriage, or in employment. The second problem, a problem women shared
with the servants at Kant’s time, is that women typically lacked the skills
required to live independent lives. This second reading obtains further sup-
port from Kant’s discussion of  women in “An Answer to the Question: ‘What
is Enlightenment?’” (8:35f.). If  we develop Kant’s conception of  women’s
rights from the theory presented in the “Doctrine of  Right” and the “Enlight-
enment” article, and pay special attention to how public right concludes pri-
vate right (including domestic right), I believe the result is quite different from
the standard account. A main problem with the standard interpretation is that
it pays too much attention to Kant’s historical and anthropological writings
and insufficient attention to his position as we find it in the “Doctrine of
Right.” For an example of  an interpretation that focuses on Kant’s historical
and anthropological writings, see Susan Mendus (1992).
24 These additional institutions make up the difference between the (libertarian)
minimal state and the liberal state, and their necessity show that the state’s
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coercive authority cannot be evaluated by appeal to the individual’s rights.
According to my interpretation of  Kant, a main problem with a libertarian
interpretation of  Kant’s position is that it mistakenly and steadfastly assumes
that the rights of  the state cannot outstrip the rights of  each individual. For
example, Nozick famously claims that “the legitimate powers of  a protective
agency are merely the sum of the individual rights that its members or clients
transfer to the association. No new rights and powers arise” (1974, p. 89).
However, we have seen that this cannot be the case, since otherwise the state
could uphold its monopoly on coercion without also reconciling this monop-
oly with the freedom of  each individual. Without establishing the necessary
additional institutions, the state cannot ensure that its monopoly on coercion
enables a condition under which each of  its citizens is placed under conditions
where their freedom is not subjected to the arbitrary choices of  another, but
only to non-arbitrary, symmetrical restrictions.
25 My view that economic justice lies at the very heart of political obligations as
presented in the “Doctrine of Right” is in disagreement with almost all contem-
porary Kant interpretations. For example, see Guyer (2000), Höffe (1994),
Holtman (2004), Kersting (1992a, 1992b), Murphy (1994), and Williams (1983).
26 Kant refers to the former as “public” uses of  reason and the latter as “private”
uses of  reason (8:37). The reasoning of  “a certain civil post or office” to which
a person was “entrusted” Kant held as being “private” since holding such
public positions entails that one is pursuing the interests of  the common-
wealth as defined by the public reason and by the resulting laws, statutes, and
decrees (8:37f.). In contrast, when engaged in what Kant calls public reason,
each citizen employs her own reasoning and judgement skills, to which there
should be no restrictions.
27 Kaufman affirms many of  the same conclusions I defend, but he utilizes dif-
ferent arguments. Contrary to Kaufman, I believe Kant’s position is inconsist-
ent with a capability approach, because such an approach is inconsistent with
Kant’s conception of  political freedom. As we saw earlier, political freedom
cannot require anyone to give up his means to enable someone else to develop
her abilities. Instead, I have argued that on Kant’s view the rightful relation
between positive and natural law follows from how the state must reconcile its
monopoly on use of  coercion with the freedom of  each. Kaufman fails to real-
ize this, I believe, because he starts from the assumption that justice is a reme-
dial virtue and he therefore presupposes that the rights of  the state are
commensurate with the rights of  individuals.
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